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Introduction: Objective of this Study 
This case study of Takeda was completed under a three year research grant from 
the Sloan Foundation. The project's purpose is to examine in a series of case studies how 
US and Japanese firms who are recognized leaders in using information technology to 
achieve long-term sustainable advantage have organized and managed this process. While 
each case is complete in itself, each is part of this larger study.1 
This pharmaceutical industry case together with other cases2 support an initial 
research hypothesis that while Japan is competitively far behind in producing most 
software, especially packaged software, some Japanese firms in key industries are very 
sophisticated software users. These firms have integrated software into their management 
strategies and use it to institutionalize organizational strengths and capture tacit 
knowledge on an iterative basis. In the past, this strategy has involved heavy reliance on 
customized and semi-customized software (Rapp 1995), but is changing towards a more 
selective use of package software managed via customized systems. Interestingly, their US 
counterparts, who generally have relied more on packaged software, are doing more 
customization, especially of systems needed to integrate software packages into something 
more closely linked with their business strategies, markets, and organizational structure. 
Thus, though coming from diff'erent directions, there appears some convergence in 
approach by these leading US and Japanese software users. The cases thus confirm what 
1
 Industries and firms examined are food retailing (Ito-Yokado and H. Butts), semiconductors (NEC and AMD), 
pharmaceuticals (Takeda and Merck), retail banking (Sanwa and Citibank), investment banking (Nomura and Credit 
Suisse First Boston), life insurance (Meiji and USAA), autos (Toyota), steel (mini-mills and integrated mills, Nippon 
Steel, Tokyo Steel and Nucor), and apparel retailing (WalMart). The case writer and the research team wish to 
express their appreciation to the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for making this work possible and to the Sloan industry 
centers for their invaluable assistance. They especially appreciate the time and guidance given by the center for 
research on pharmaceuticals at MIT as well as Mr. Sato at Takeda. 
1
 This refers to cases for which interviews have been completed. See footnote 3. 
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some other analysts have hypothesized, a coherent business strategy is a necessary 
condition for a successful information technology strategy (Wold and Shriver 1993).3 
Yet, implementation and design of each company's software and software strategy 
is unique to its competitive situation, industry and strategic objectives. These factors 
influence how they choose between packaged and customized software options for 
achieving specific goals and how they measure their success. Indeed, as part of their 
strategic integration, Takeda and the other leading software users interviewed have linked 
their software strategies with their overall management goals through clear mission 
statements that explicitly note the importance of information technology to firm success. 
They have coupled this with active Chief Information Officer and information 
technology support group participation in the firm's business and decision making 
structure. Thus for firms like Takeda the totally independent Management Information 
System department is a thing of the past. This may be a reason why outsourcing for them 
is not an option, though successful performance is not based solely on software. Rather 
software is an integral element of their overall management strategy and plays a key role in 
serving corporate goals such as enhancing productivity, improving inventory management 
or strengthening customer relations. These systems thus must be coupled with an 
appropriate approach to manufacturing, R&D, and marketing reflecting Takeda's clear 
understanding of their business, their industry and their firm's competitive strengths within 
this context. This clear business vision has enabled them to select, develop and use the 
type of software they require for each business function and to integrate these into a total 
3
 These and other summary results are presented in another Center on Japanese Economy and Business 
working paper: William V. Rapp, "Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Through Information 
Technology: The Emergence of Controlled Production," December 1998 
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support system for their operations to achieve corporate objectives. Since this vision 
impacts other corporate decisions, they have good human resource and financial 
characteristics (Appendix I & II). 
Yet Takeda does share some common themes with other leading software users 
such as the creation of large proprietary interactive databases that promote automatic 
feedback between various stages and/or players in the production, delivery and 
consumption process. Reduced inventories and improved control of the production 
process are also common. They are also able organizationally and competitively to build 
beneficial feedback cycles or loops that increase productivity in areas as different as R&D, 
design and manufacturing while reducing cycle times and defects or integrating production 
and delivery. Improved cycle times reduce costs and increase the reliability of forecasts 
since they need to cover a shorter period. Customer satisfaction is improved through on-
time delivery. Thus, software inputs are critical factors in Takeda's and other leading 
users' overall business strategies with strong positive competitive implications for doing it 
successfully and potentially negative implications for competitors. 
An important consideration in this respect is the possible emergence of a new 
strategic manufacturing paradigm in which Takeda may be a participant. In the same way 
mass production dramatically improved on craft production through the economies of 
large scale plants that used standardized parts and lean production improved on mass 
production through making the production line more continuous, reducing inventories and 
tying production more closely to actual demand, what might be called "controlled" 
production seems to significantly improve productivity through monitoring, controlling 
and linking every aspect of producing and delivering a product or service including after 
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sales service and repair. Such controlled production is only possible by actively using 
information technology and software systems to continuously provide the monitoring and 
control function to what had previously been a rather automatic system response to 
changes in expected or actual consumer demand. This may be why their skillful use of 
information technology is seen by themselves and industry analysts as important to their 
business success, but only when it is integrated with the business from both an operation 
and organization standpoint reflecting overall business strategy and clarity of competitive 
vision. Therefore at Takeda the software and systems development people are part of the 
decision making structure while the system itself is an integral part of delivering and 
supporting its products. This can be particularly critical in pharmaceuticals where even 
after clinical trials there is a continuous need to monitor potential side effects. 
Therefore Seagate Technology may be correct for Takeda too when they state in 
their 1997 Annual Report "We are experiencing a new industrial revolution, one more 
powerful than any before it. In this emerging digital world of the Third Millennium, 
the new currency will be information. How we harness it will mean the difference 
between success and failure, between having competitive advantage and being an 
also-ran." 
In Takeda's case as with other leaders, the key is to develop a mix of packaged 
and customized software that supports their business strategies and differentiates them 
from their competitors. However, they have not tried to adapt their organizational 
structure to the software. Given this perspective, functional and market gains have 
justified the additional expense incurred through customization, including the related costs 
of integrating customized and packaged software into a single information system. They 
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do this by assessing the possible business uses of software organizationally and 
operationally and especially its role in enhancing Takeda's core competencies. While they 
will use systems used by competitors if there is no business advantage to developing their 
own, they reject the view that information systems are generic products best developed by 
outside vendors who can achieve low cost through economies of scale and who can more 
easily afford to invest in the latest technologies.4 
In undertaking this and the other case studies, the project team sought to answer 
certain key questions while still recognizing firm, country and industry differences. These 
have been explained in the summary paper referenced in footnote 3. We have set them 
forth in Appendix I where Takeda's profile is presented based on our interviews and other 
research. Readers who wish to assess for themselves the way Takeda's strategies and 
approaches to using information technology address these issues may wish to review 
4
 Takeda and the other cases have been developed using a common methodology that examines cross national pairs of 
firms in key industries. In principle, each pair of case studies focuses on a Japanese and American finn in an industry 
where software is a significant and successful input into competitive performance. The firms examined are ones 
recognized by the Sloan industry centers and by the industry as ones using software successfully4. To develop the 
studies, we combined analysis of existing research results with questionnaires and direct interviews. Further, to relate 
these materials to previous work as well as the expertise located in each industry center, we held working meetings 
with each center and coupled new questionnaires with the materials used in the previous study to either update or 
obtain a questionnaire similar to the one used in the 1993-95 research (Rapp 1995). This method enabled us to relate 
each candidate and industry to earlier results. We also worked with the industry centers to develop a set of questions 
that specifically relate to a firm's business strategy and software's role within that. Some questions address issues 
that appear relatively general across industries such as inventory control. Others such as managing the drug pipeline 
are more specific to a particular industry. The focus has been to establish the firm's perception of its industry and its 
competitive position as well as its advantage in developing and using a software strategy. The team also contacted 
customers, competitors, and industry analysts to determine whether competitive benefits or impacts perceived by the 
firm were recognized outside the organization. These sources provided additional data on measures of 
competitiveness as well as industry strategies and structure. The case studies are thus based on extensive interviews 
by the project team on software's use and integration into management strategies to improve competitiveness in 
specific industries, augmenting existing data on industry dynamics, firm organizational structure and management 
strategy collected from the Sloan industry enters. In addition, we gathered data from outside sources and firms or 
organizations with which we worked in the earlier project. Finally, the US and Japanese companies in each industry 
that were selected on the basis of being perceived as successfully using software in a key role in their competitive 
strategies in fact saw their use of software in this exact manner while these competitive benefits were generally 
confirmed after further research. 
Appendix I prior to reading the case. For others it may be a useful summary. 5 
The Pharmaceutical Industry in a Global Context 
In advanced countries that represent its primary market, the pharmaceutical 
industry is an exceptionally research intensive industry where many firms are large 
multinationals. It is also heavily regulated for both local producers and MNCs. 
Regulations work as both constraints and performance boosters since drugs are used with 
other medical and healthcare services. So healthcare expenditures are divided among many 
industries and providers of which pharmaceuticals are only one. All parties involved are 
interested in influencing the regulatory environment and in participating in the growth in 
healthcare services. This means understanding the industry requires appreciating its 
political economic context. In this regard, healthcare providers in rich nations are currently 
under pressure to control costs due to aging populations. Regulators who have the 
authority to change the demand structure through laws and regulations are considering 
various measures to reduce costs such as generic drug substitution which may mean lower 
returns for discovering and developing drugs. Still, if drugs are more effective in reducing 
healthcare costs compared to other treatments, they can benefit. Since R&D is at the heart 
of competition and in competing for healthcare expenditures, each drug company must 
respond to these cost containment pressures cautiously and strategically. 
Another important aspect of this industry is technological change arising from the 
5
 The questions are broken into the following categories: General Management and Corporate Strategy, 
Industry Related Issues, Competition, Country Related Issues, IT Strategy, IT Operations, Human 
Resources and Organization, Various Metrics such as Inventory Control, Cycle Times and Cost 
Reduction, and finally some Conclusions and Results. They cover a range of issues from direct use of 
software to achieve competitive advantage, to corporate strategy, to criteria for selecting software, to 
industry economics, to measures of success, to organizational integration, to beneficial loops, to training 
and institutional dynamics, and finally to interindustry comparisons. 
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convergence of life and biological sciences. Many disciplines now work together to 
uncover the mechanisms that lie behind our bodies and various diseases. Examples are 
molecular biology, cell biology, biophysics, genetics, evolutionary biology, and 
bioinformatics. As scientists see life from such new chemical and physical viewpoints, the 
ability to represent, process and organize the massive data based on these theories 
becomes critical. Because computers are very flexible scientific instruments (Rosenberg 
1994), progress in information technology and computer science has broadened scientific 
frontiers for the life and biological sciences. These advances have opened new doors to 
attack more complex diseases, some chronic diseases of old age. Such therapeutic areas 
are areas of opportunity for pharmaceutical companies since they address demographic 
and technical changes in advanced countries. Still to take advantage of these opportunities 
requires information technology capabilities. 
Historically, the industry has been relatively stable where the big players have 
remained unchanged for years. This has been due to various entry barriers such as R&D 
costs, advertising expense, and strong expertise in managing clinical trials. It is difficult 
and expensive for a new company to acquire this combination of skills quickly. However, 
there are signs the industry and required mix of skills may be changing. There have been 
several cross national mergers especially between U.S. and European companies. In 
addition, new biotechnology companies are very good at basic research, which may force 
pharmaceutical R&D to transform itself. For example, no single company, even among the 
new mega-companies, is large enough to cover all new areas of expertise and therapeutic 
initiatives. Thus, many competitors have had to form strategic alliances to learn or access 
new technologies and to capture new markets. Conversely, a stand-alone company may 
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have much to lose. The challenge facing large pharmaceutical companies is how fast and 
how effectively they can move to foster both technological innovation and cost 
containment without exposing themselves to too much risk. 
Japan's pharmaceutical industry reflects these cost containment pressures, the need 
to harmonize expensive and time consuming clinical trials, and the impact of extensive 
regulations. Thus in responding to common pressures, Takeda is moving away from 
typical Japanese management methods and is starting to emphasize globalization to spread 
R&D costs, individual creativity to stimulate new drug development, and the use of 
information technology to handle expanded data management and R&D requirements. 
Information technology has had its impacts too. First-tier firms have had to follow 
a trend in R&D strategies that increasingly use information technologies. Exchange of data 
and ideas across national borders has become relatively easy, and contracts may specify 
access to another company's database. Because many companies share similar R&D 
instruments and methods, one company's instruments may be compatible with other 
companies'. Indeed, the trend towards greater use of Web-based technology in R&D and 
other operations may change our notion of a firm and its boundaries. Firms may eventually 
be characterized by knowledge creating capabilities (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Having 
more ways to communicate with other companies makes frequent communication with 
greater nuance possible. This supports the trend towards more strategic alliances unless 
overtaken by the creation of larger firms through continued mergers. 
However, since mergers in Japan are rare, the Japan's industry remains fragmented 
with excess competition. Further, though the industry has been profitable, MHW 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare) has not given strong incentives to produce innovative 
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drugs. Rather, its main task has been to provide and ensure good healthcare services to 
everyone regardless of the ability to pay. Since drugs are just one way to improve health, 
consumers should want to remain healthy and choose cost effective means to do so. 
However, reality is insurance systems covering different services give incentives and 
disincentives for particular care (Schweitzer 1997). Thus, coordinated adjustment of 
prices for healthcare is necessary to get markets for healthcare products to work better. In 
Japan, this has led to more centralized decision-making by MHW. It has set the reward 
scheme available to healthcare providers such as pharmaceutical companies to reduce 
transaction costs (Ikegami and Campbell 1996) and promote innovation. This has led 
critics to argue MHW has approved too many new drugs, some with weak therapeutic 
values or whose interactions with other medicines is not clear. Because doctors have 
preferred to prescribe such new drugs due to higher cost and greater profit under Japan's 
reimbursement scheme, it is possible good existing drugs proven safe and effective over a 
long period have been forced out by new drugs with greater uncertainty about their long-
run effects. Due to some recent regulatory lapses, the public is now pushing for more 
stringent regulations and rigorous scientific analysis as well as greater accountability by 
major drug manufacturers. In addition, Japanese drug manufacturers are subject along 
with other industries to the 1995 Product Liability Law. These developments are putting 
more pressure on Japanese pharmaceutical firms to put more resources into R&D, to 
focus more critically on just ethical drug development for the global market and to be 
more careful in gathering information on clinical trials and side effects. 
Uniike the U.S., MHW promotes and regulates the industry. But institutional 
support for the industry has been weak compared to NTH's unified approach. Also, 
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biomedical research is covered by five ministries (Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology Agency, MHW, MITI, and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). 
Coordinated biomedical research is thus institutionally difficult (Hiroi 1996). Some 
pharmaceutical companies are not happy with this and an MHW survey showed eight 
leading Japanese firms were now undertaking extensive research outside Japan (Roehl, 
Mitchell, Slatter 1995). 
Industry economics are driven by pharmaceutical R&D's very lengthy process, 
composed of discovering, developing and bringing to market new etnical drugs with the 
latter heavily determined by the drug approval process in major markets such as the U.S., 
Europe and Japan. Ethical drugs are biological and medicinal chemicals advertised and 
promoted primarily to the medical, pharmacy, and allied professions. Ethical drugs include 
products available only by prescription as well as some over-the-counter drugs 
(Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 1970-1991). These new therapeutic etnical 
products fall into four broad categories (U.S. Congress, OTA 1993): one, new chemical 
entities (NCEs)—new therapeutic entities (NTEs)--new therapeutic molecular compounds 
never before used or tested in humans; two, drug delivery mechanisms—new approaches 
to delivering therapeutic agents at the desired dose to the desired part of the body; three, 
next stage products—new combinations, formulations, dosing forms, or dosing strengths of 
existing compounds that must be tested in humans before market introduction; four, 
generic products—copies of drugs not protected by patents or other exclusive marketing 
rights. 
From a major pharmaceutical firm's viewpoint, NCEs are the most important, and 
R&D of innovative drugs drives industry success. Since it is a risky and very expensive 
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process, understanding their R&D and drug approval process is critical to understanding 
firm strategy and competitiveness both domestically and globally. Only about 1 in 60,000 
compounds synthesized by laboratories can be regarded as "highly successful" (U.S. 
Congress, OTA 1993). Thus, it is important to stop the R&D process if one recognizes 
success is not likely. Chemists and biologists used to decide which drugs to pursue, but 
R&D is now more systematic and is a collective company decision since it can involve 
expenditures of $250 to $350 million prior to market launch. Key factors in the decision 
making process are expected costs and returns, the behavior of competitors, liability 
concerns, and possible future government policy changes (Schweitzer 1997). Thus, stage 
reviews during drug R&D are common. Past experiences in development, manufacturing, 
regulatory approvals, and marketing can provide ample guidance. 
NCE's are discovered either through screening existing compounds or designing 
new molecules. Once synthesized, they go through a rigorous testing process. Their 
pharmacological activity, therapeutic promise, and toxicity are tested using isolated cell 
cultures and animals as well as computer models. It is then modified to a related 
compound to optimize its pharmacological activity with fewer undesirable biological 
properties (U.S. Congress, OTA 1993). Once preclinical studies are completed and the 
NCE has been proven safe on animals, the drug sponsor applies for Investigational New 
Drug (IND) status. If it receives approval, it starts Phase I clinical trials to establish the 
tolerance of healthy human subjects at different doses to study pharmacological effects on 
humans in anticipated dosage levels. It also studies its absorption, distribution, 
metabolism, and excretion patterns. This stage requires careful supervision since one does 
not know if the drug is safe on humans. During phase II a relatively small number of 
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patients participate in controlled trials of the compound's potential usefulness and short 
term risks. Phase III trials gather precise information on the drug's effectiveness for 
specific indications, and determine whether it produces a broader range of adverse effects 
than those exhibited in the smaller phase I and II trials. Phase III trials can involve several 
hundred to several thousand subjects and are extremely expensive. Stage reviews occur 
before and during each phase, and drug development may be terminated at any point in the 
pipeline if the risk of failure and the added cost needed to prove effectiveness outweigh 
the weighted probability of success. 
If clinical trials are successful, the sponsor seeks marketing approval. If approved, 
the drug can be marketed immediately, though often officials require some amendments 
before marketing can proceed. However, successful drug development and sales not oniy 
require approval of therapeutic value and validity but also that the manufacturing process 
meet stringent standards. U.S. regulations require Phase IV trials where manufacturers 
selling drugs must notify the FDA periodically about the performance of their products. 
This surveillance is designed to detect uncommon, yet serious, adverse reactions typically 
not revealed during premarket testing. Tnis postapproval process is especially important 
when phase III trials were completed under smaller fast track reviews. These studies 
usually include use by children or by those using multiple drugs where potential 
interactions can be important (Schweitzer 1997). Furthermore, because drug development 
costs are so high relative to production costs, patent protection is another key aspect of a 
company's management strategy. One must apply for a patent within one year of 
developing an NCE. Therefore, patenting is usually early in the development cycle or prior 
to filing the NCE. But as this begins the life of the patent, shortening the approval period 
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extends the drug's effective revenue life under patent. This makes management of clinical 
trials and the approval process an important strategic variable. 
Although creating a drug pipeline through various stages of development is 
relatively standardized, it is changing as companies use different methods to reduce time 
and related costs of new drug development. Companies constantly pressure the authorities 
to reduce NDA review times. Accelerated approval speeds new drugs to market saving 
companies tens of millions of dollars in negative cash flow. However, it does not generate 
the clinical values that insurers and managed care organizations currently demand. 
Countering this is the trend among drug firms to increase the complexity of their analyses 
during clinical trials. Companies have begun to use cost-effective analysis in their 
evaluation of new drugs to assess competing product development investment alternatives 
and to integrate cost effectiveness analysis into their clinical trials. They also try to capture 
quality of life measures such as how patients perceive their lives wnile using the new drug. 
Companies vary their analysis by country (Rettig 1997) since measures of effectiveness 
shift according to clinical practice, accessibility to doctors, and what different cultures 
value as important. There are no universal measures of the quality of life. At present, the 
components measured depend largely on the objectives of each researcher but some 
companies are trying to introduce more systematic measures. Nevertheless, no matter 
what components are chosen for these studies, capturing, storing and using the data 
requires sophisticated software and data base management techniques which must be 
correlated with various families of molecules. Also, to avoid the moral hazard of focusing 
on the weaknesses in a competitor's drug or molecule, some analysts argue that 
companies should examine all domains and their components (Spilker 1996) and move 
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towards agreed performance standards. In addition, quality of life measures should only be 
used when they are of practical use to doctors in treating patients (Levine 1996). Such 
judgments should be sensitive and informed and should cover criteria related and 
important to a broad spectrum of patients. These trends make clinical trials and data 
gathering complex and expensive and put a premium on a firm's ability to manage the 
process efficiently, including creating and using large patient and treatment databases. 
The research process differs from production. Yet, both are important, particularly 
the firm's knowledge of scale-up. This is difficult because production requires uniformity 
at every stage. Making the average chemical make-up constant is not enough. Careful 
scale-up is essential to avoid contamination (Takeda 1992). Variations in commercial 
production must be very small. This requires constant control of variables such as the 
preparation of raw materials, solvents, reaction conditions, and yields (Takeda 1992). 
Often, experience will help achieve purer output in the intermediate processes and this will 
alleviate problems later on. Thus, there is a learning curve in process R&D which starts at 
the laboratory (Takeda 1992). An important distinction is between continuous process and 
batch process. In the continuous process raw materials and sub-raw materials go into a 
flow process that produces output continuously. This continuous process is more difficult 
because many parameters and conditions have to be kept constant. This requires a good 
understanding of both optimizing the chemical process and maintaining safeguards against 
abnormal conditions. However, continuous processes are less dangerous and require fewer 
people to control at the site (Takeda 1992) than batch processing where the chemicals are 
produced in batches, put in pill form and then stored for future distribution and sale. 
The following compares initial process R&D once a compound is discovered and 
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commercial manufacturing for a representative chemical entity (Pisano 1996). 
Comparison research process and commercial production for representative chemical 
entity ("Pisano 1996s) 
Process R&D in chemical pharmaceuticals involves three stages: (1) process 
research, where basic process chemistry (synthetic route) is explored and chosen; (2) pilot 
development, where the process is run and refined in an intermediate-scale pilot plant; and 
(3) technology transfer and startup, where process is run at a commercial manufacturing 
site (Pisano 1997). Pisano argues the scientific base of chemistry is more mature than 
biotechnology and this difference accounts for more extensive use of computer simulations 
in drugs made by chemical synthesis than biotechnology-based drugs. 
Codifying the knowledge in chemistry and chemical engineering in software has a 
higher explanatory power than in biotechnology. In chemistry, many scientific laws are 
available for process variables such as pressure, volume, and temperature. Computer 
models can simulate these in response to given parameters to predict cost, inputs and yield 
(Pisano 1997). By contrast, biotechnology has aspects that are more art than science in 
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that the skill and experience of the researcher can affect results and one cannot rely fully 
on mixing precise quantities of chemicals by formula. This is particularly true for large-
scale biotechnology processes (Pisano 1997). Simulation is thus less reliably extrapolated 
to commercial production. An additional factor is the importance of purification after 
large-scale production in bioreactors in biotechnology-based drugs. It is not rare at this 
stage of extraction and purification that commercial application becomes impossible, even 
though the scale-up is successful. Since avoiding contamination is the key in 
biotechnology-based drugs, extracting and purifying a small amount of the desired 
materials from a large amount of broth is critical. This process is done using filters, 
chromatography, and other methods specific to organisms (Koide 1994). 
Technological Factors 
All scientific frontiers affect pharmaceutical companies. Since no company can be 
an expert on everything, which technology to develop in-house and what to license or 
subcontract have become important issues. In general, pharmaceutical companies were 
skeptical of new developments in small biotechnology firms. Yet the latter now provide 
new techniques in basic research and fermentation to the MNCs. Other pharmaceutical 
companies then tend to follow when competitors adopt ideas from less well known 
biotech companies. This is why many such companies announce platform deals with drug 
companies to get more financial resources and opportunities. Biotechnology based 
pharmaceuticals have entered a new development stage which requires the capital, 
manufacturing and marketing expertise of the large companies. 
New drug discovery methods and biotechnology each demand skills different from 
earlier times. Emerging biotech companies offer new ideas and research tools. Other new 
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technologies such as stripping out side effects, specialized drug delivery systems, and 
"antisense" which cancels out the disease causing messages of faulty RNA also come from 
biotechnology (Tortune 1997). These are promising areas of drug research and potential 
products. Moreover, these biotech companies develop new drugs more quickly than large 
firms. However, often they have difficulty in managing clinical trials and the approval 
process, an area where large firms have considerable experience and expertise, including 
sophisticated software for tracking the large data bases and handling the new 
computerized application procedure. In addition, biotechnology demands skills in large 
scale commercial production wnich smaller startups may not possess. Thus, close 
association with large firms is logical and efficient and one should expect more future 
alliances and joint ventures. 
Another important factor wnich further encourages specialization in a network of 
companies is the industry's heavy use of information technology. Indeed, software 
strategies have become an important part of the industry through their impact on R&D, 
drug approval, including clinical trials, and control of manufacturing. If decisions in a 
science based industry are generally driven by knowledge creation capability dependent on 
human resources, having information sharing and access mechanisms so complementary 
capabilities can be efficiently exchanged and used becomes key to successful corporate 
strategy, especially when that knowledge is growing and becoming increasingly diverse. 
Another information sharing issue related to biotech is pharmacology. Classical 
pharmacology models are often irrelevant for biotech-based drugs. While some proteins 
express their activities across other species, others can be more species specific. Neither 
poor results nor good animal trial results need be predictive for humans. Particularly 
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difficult problems are those related to toxicology since some animals develop neutralizing 
antibodies (Harris 1997). Technical support systems are important in biotechnology as 
well. One is transgenic animals. They provide information on the contribution of particular 
genes to a disease. This is done by inserting genes that have the function of expressing the 
phenotype, or interbreeding heterozygotic animals to produce "knockout animals" that 
suffer from inherited metabolic diseases. Transgenic animals are relevant to early phase 
clinical trials since the data from these animals contribute useful data on dose-selection 
and therapeutic rations in human studies. In addition, they offer hints to which variables 
are secondary. This simplifies the clinical trial design. In general, significant input in the 
design and running of phase I and II trials must come from the bench scientists who built 
the molecule (Harris 1997). Since clinical trials for biotech drugs lack clear guidelines, in-
house communication among drug discovery, preclinical and clinical trials is important, 
especially due to the increased use of transgenic animals bred to examine inherited 
diseases. This process can be greatly facilitated by information sharing technologies and 
acts as another driver towards a more integrated approach to decision making using IT. 
This is also true of structure-based drug ("rational drug") design or molecular 
modeling which is a range of computerized techniques based on theoretical chemistry 
methods and experimental data used either to analyze molecules and molecular systems or 
to predict molecular and biological properties (Cohen 1996). Traditional methods of drug 
discovery consist of taking a lead structure and developing a chemical program for finding 
analog molecules exhibiting the desired biological properties in a systematic way. The 
initial compounds were found by chance or random screening. Tnis process involved 
several trial and error cycles developed by medicinal chemists using their intuition to select 
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a candidate analog for further development. This traditional method has been 
supplemented by structure-based drug design (Cohen 1996) which tries to use the 
molecular targets involved in disorder. The relationsnip between a drug and its receptor is 
complex and not completely known. The structure-based ligand design attempts to create 
a drug that has a good fit with the receptor. This fit is optimized by minimizing energies of 
interaction. But, this determination of optimum interaction energy of a ligand in a known 
receptor site remains difficult. Computer models permit manipulations such as 
superposition and energy calculation that are difficult with mechanical models. They also 
provide an exhaustive way to analyze molecules and to save and store this data for later 
use or after a research chemist has left. However, models must still be tested and used and 
eventually, chemical intuition is required to analyze the data (Gund 1996). Then the drug 
must proceed through animal and clinical trials. 
Still the idea behind this modeling is the principle a molecule's biological 
properties are related to its structure. Tnis reflects a better understanding of biochemistry. 
So rational drug design has also benefited from biotechnology. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
drug discovery was still grounded in organic chemistry. Now rational drug design provides 
customized drug design synthesized specifically to activate or inactivate particular 
physiological mechanisms. This technique is most useful in particular therapeutic areas. 
For example, histamine receptor knowledge was an area where firms first took advantage 
of rational design, since its underlying mechanism was understood early (Bogner and 
Thomas 1996). The starting point is the molecular target in the body. So one is working 
from demand rather than finding a use for a new molecule. 
This has been facilitated by software and hardware becoming less costly. Thus 
20 
many scientists are paying attention to computational techniques that are easier to use than 
mechanical models. This underscores the role of instrumentation in scientific research 
stressed by Rosenberg (1994). Availability of new instruments, including computers, has 
opened new opportunities in technological applications and furthered research in new 
directions. Three dimensional graphics, particularly, suit the needs of a multi-disciplinary 
team since everyone has different chemical intuition but appreciates the 3-D image. 
Rosenberg (1994) notes scientists who move across disciplines bring those concepts and 
tools to other scientific disciplines, such as from physics to biology and chemistry. Tnis 
suggests the importance of sharing instruments, particularly computer images and 
databases that help people work and tnink together. 
The predominant systems of molecular modeling calculations are UNIX 
workstations. But other hardware such as desktop Macintoshes, MS-DOS personal 
computers on the low end and computer servers and supercomputers on the high end have 
been used. Computational power is required for more complex calculations and tnis guides 
the choice of hardware. A variety of commercial software packages are available from 
$50-$5,000 for PC-based systems to $100,000 or more for supercomputers. Universities, 
research institutes, and commercial laboratories develop these packages. Still, no one 
system meets all the molecular modeler's needs. The industry therefore desperately needs 
an open, high-level programming environment allowing various applications to work 
together (Gund 1996). This means those who want to take advantage of this technology 
for strategic reasons now must be able to do their own software development. Tnis is the 
competitive software compulsion facing many drug producers. In turn, the better they can 
select systems, develop their capabilities, and manage their use, the more successful they 
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will be in drug development and in managing other aspects of the drug pipeline. 
The choice of hardware is based on the availability of software and the 
performance criteria needed to run your software. Current major constraints are the power 
of graphics programs and the way the chemist interacts with the data and its 
representation (Hubbard 1996). Apple computers have frequently been used in R&D 
because of superior graphics. This edge may be eroded by the new PC's using Pentium 
MMX as well as moves to more open systems. The real issue, though, is the presence of 
software packages for the MAC that research scientists know and rely on but are not yet 
available for Windows NT. 
In sum, rational design has opened new research based on a firm's understanding 
of biochemical mechanisms. This means tremendous opportunities to enter new 
therapeutic areas. However, since rational design is very expensive, it has raised entry 
costs and the minimum effective size for pharmaceutical firms. Tnis has favored firms with 
broader product lines able to spread the costs of equipment over many projects and to 
transfer knowledge across therapeutic areas, contributing to the increased cost of new 
drugs through higher R&D and systems support spending (Bogner and Thomas 1996). A 
similar analysis applies to major U.S. and Japanese companies use of other new 
technologies to discover and develop drugs systematically, such as combinatorial 
chemistry, robotic nigh-throughput screening, advances in medical genetics, and 
bioinformatics. These technologies affect not only R&D but also the organization and the 
way they deal with other organizations as many new technologies are complementary. For 
example, high-throughput screening automates the screening process to identify 
compounds for further testing or to optimize the lead compound. Thus, both regulatory 
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and technological change have raised the advantage of developing innovative drugs, even 
though it is inherently risky and forces firms to develop better skills in using information 
technology to support the process. 
Japan 
Trends in Japanese healthcare are heavily impacting the pharmaceutical industry as 
well due to drastic changes in its economic and regulatory environment. The population is 
aging quickly. So it is inevitable that total medical expenditures will rise. Japan is 
becoming a country with the world's largest percentage of people over 65 (table below). 
Since everyone is covered by either public or private medical insurance, MHW is under 
pressure from MOF (Ministry of Finance) to control National Health Plan costs. The MOF 
wants to reduce General Account expenditures. Thus, it supports MHW's reductions in 
healthcare costs. Its main political opponent is the Japanese Medical Association (JMA). 
Persons Aged over 65 
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(as % of GDP) Total Public Per Capita 
1993 1983 1993 1983 1993 1983 
Australia 8.5 7.7 5.8 5.0 1,494 860 
Belgium 8.3 7.6 7.3 6.2 1,601 814 
Canada 10.2 8.6 7.4 6.5 1,971 1,040 
Finland 8.8 6.9 7.0 5.5 1,363 714 
France 9.8 8.2 7.3 6.4 1,835 954 
Germany 8.6 8.5 6.0 6.2 1,814 1,012 
Italy 8.5 7.0 6.2 5.5 1,523 729 
Japan 7.3 6.9 5.2 5.0 1,495 719 
Netherlands 8.7 8.3 6.8 6.2 1,532 869 
Spain 7.3 6.0 5.7 5.1 972 433 
Sweden 7.5 9.5 6.2 8.7 1,266 1,094 
United Kingdom 7.1 6.0 5.9 5.2 1,213 605 
United States 14.1 10.6 6.2 9.4 3,299 1,489 
(a) unit: in $PPPs (Purchasing Power Parities); * OECD Health Data 1995. OECD 
Recently, to control healthcare expenditures, MHW has changed the way it 
administers the Plan to prepare for the aging population. The reform has been developed 
by the three leading political parties (LDP, Social Democrats, New Sakigake) and is on 
the Diet's agenda for 1998. It covers the healthcare delivery system, pharmaceutical 
prices, and the reward scheme for diagnosis. Under the proposal, patients will get more 
information and explanation from doctors with respect to their treatment. Informed 
consent with respect to medical care is encouraged. Second, the program will try to 
establish a system of primary care doctors who will see patients locally. If necessary, they 
will refer patients to more specialized organizations. Because the current system has been 
criticized for excessive drug prescription and frequent medical exams using expensive 
equipment, a principal objective is more efficient distribution of medical services. 
The proposal also examines a possible six-year education program for 
pharmacologists. Third, to correct the high share of drugs in healthcare expenditures, 
MHW plans to eliminate official drug prices. Instead, they will introduce a reference price 
system which will reflect the market price for all drugs in that therapeutic category. The 
Health Insurance Plan would pay based on the reference price. If patients pay for a drug at 
a higher price, they have to bear the difference. On the other hand, if patients pay for a 
drug at a lower price, the health organization that sells the drug will get only the reference 
price. This may cause problems since, once patients get sick, they may feel their 
bargaining power over price is limited after a particular drug has been prescribed. Fourth, 
MHW will reform the way clinical trials are run so greater safety is ensured. Fifth, they 
will promote separating prescription and purchase of drugs through eliminating a doctor's 
or clinic's ability to run pharmacies. 
Although it is not clear how tnis proposal will be put into practice, one can see a 
move towards a more Western system with doctors acting more like professionals paid a 
high fee for their technical skills. This would contrast with the current Health Plan that 
gives doctors low standard payments irrespective of skill. Some doctors do not like this 
and want to be treated as professionals (Ikegami and Campbell). Further, tnis relatively 
low Plan payment is sometimes not sufficient and induces doctors to over-prescribe drugs 
since they get the difference between the official price and the price paid the wholesaler. 
Another plan being discussed is the implementation of Diagnosis Related Groups 
(DRG). Under tnis system, a plan determines the fee a doctor will receive based on the 
disease. The goal is to create relatively cost-homogeneous therapeutic groups. The DRG 
concept was developed in the 1970's in the U.S. It considers the existence of concomitant 
diseases and complications, patient age, and the treatment (Zwifel, Breyer 1996). It is used 
in Medicare where Medicare reimburses hospitals based on the average cost of treating 
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patients within the DRG. Tnis induces hospitals to limit costs since they keep any amount 
the DRG payment exceeds their costs but are responsible for those exceeding the DRG 
payment. The US DRG system adjusts its payments for regional differentials as well as for 
higher cost teaching hospitals. The problem may be that the profit incentive is too strong. 
Critics charge the system encourages hospitals to discharge patients "quicker and sicker", 
leaving patients or their families bearing the burden of paying for nursing care (Rodwin 
1993). Tnis suggests some change must be necessary (Morgan et. al. 1997). 
Japan has been relatively successful compared to many countries in containing 
medical costs. Tnis may be partially due to avoiding adverse selection plus more direct 
control of commercial health organizations. MHW's flexible approach in making necessary 
changes annually has avoided tnis problem so far. For example, the standard 
reimbursement price for medicines on average went down 8.1% in 1992. In 1994, an "R 
zone (Reasonable Zone)" was set at 13%. This means the list price is only allowed to be 
13% nigher than the weighted average of its wholesale prices. The result was a 6.6% drop 
in list prices. These measures have continued to reduce the margin for hospitals, doctors 
and wholesalers, although, except in 1997, profit rates for major pharmaceutical firms 
remained constant. One major reason is higher prices for new medicines. This is true even 
though these medicines have often lacked innovation. They still have commanded higher 
official prices than previous ones. Although prices for older drugs are under control, drug 
companies have introduced new products to offset cost containment effects. Tnis has led 
to a lack of innovation for many "me-too" drugs. Since old drugs may be as good as new 
ones, there has been a need to look carefully at what new drugs contribute to health. 
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MHW's price correction in 1996 tried to address this problem by suppressing the prices of 
new drugs which were not innovative. Still list prices went down by 6.8%. In addition, 
prices of drugs whose demand was greater than initally expected were subject to 
reexamination. This followed a German cost containment system. In 1997, following the 
increase in the consumption tax from 3% to 5%, list drug prices were again examined. The 
result was a 3% decrease in the average list price, including the consumption tax. This 
Since MHW is concerned with social security and the general welfare in addition to health 
matters, pharmaceutical industry interests are usually not well-represented in its policy 
making process. Moreover, a primary objective remains reducing the growing fiscal 
pressures arising from the aging population. According to MHW's projections (Nakazawa 
1997), it should be successful in achieving this goal if the projected Health Insurance 
deficit is reduced as in the graph below. Because it does directly control the Health Plan, it 
can closely monitor the Plan's cost and development. MHW's actions may thus signal 
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broader cost containment strategies given Japan's aging population and the impact of its 
proposed reforms on all healthcare reimbursement. The expected deficit will fall due to 
changes in National Health Plan coverage that start in September 1997. In addition, Japan 
made GPMSP (good post-marketing surveillance practice) a legal obligation for 
pharmaceuticals in 1993. The need for this has risen because MHW is becoming more 
aggressive about enforcing regulations which require information on the side-effects 
experienced by all patients due to the unpredictable nature of new drugs based on rapidly 
emerging new science and technology. Furthermore, the elderly who take multiple 
medicines are more likely to experience complications. Also information on complicated 
interactions is not always available during clinical trials because they do not cover their 
long term effects or always test groups taking all potential drug combinations.Tnis is 
because clinical trials have put constraints on their subjects based on age and other 
complications, so rarer side effects are not accurately assessed during clinical trials 
because of data limitations (Kusunoki 1996). Therefore, feedback from doctors who 
administer drugs to seniors after their commercial introduction has become more 
important. 
In 1990 the ICH (International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use) was first held. There 
have been three sessions since, the last in July 1997. Its aim has been to harmonize clinical 
trials to exchange data internationally and introduce drugs to various markets more 
quickly. Many large international drugs firms would benefit from tnis as it reduces the cost 
of introducing drugs to new markets while helping to expand markets and speed cash flow 
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receipts. However, for Japanese and foreign companies to meet the harmonization 
requirements and benefit from tnis development by spreading their R&D costs over a 
global market, there is a need for foreign and Japanese companies to reassess how they 
manage clinical trials in Japan to evaluate the effects of drug treatments. This is because 
nistorically Japan's approach to treating certain diseases has been different than the West's 
and because diseases affecting the population have a different profile. Furthermore, clinical 
practices vary and are often structured or adapted to suit the dominant drug available to 
treat a given condition. Therefore, the data companies gather in other countries may not 
be helpful in assessing a drug's effectiveness in Japan. In these cases, companies have to 
reassess data when feedback from doctors suggests further investigation is required. At 
the same time, when results are similar, Japanese drug companies who have good R&D 
can benefit from this development wnile those who do not will suffer from increased 
foreign competition. The "Ethnic Factors Guidelines" is scheduled to be signed in 
February 1998. 
The Japanese Pharmaceutical Industry and Takeda 
Japan's pharmaceutical market is higniy fragmented. In addition to traditional drug 
companies, there have been many new entrants including chemical firms, petrochemical 
companies and food companies. There are alsofirms producing traditional Chinese and 
Japanese remedies as well as OTC medicines. It is estimated that 1,000 companies 
manufacture drugs. But only a little over two hundred have a large proportion of their 
revenues from ethical drugs. Furthermore, even among these 200, several purchase in bulk 
from wnich they manufacture drugs. These second-tier companies are only packagers who 
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do not discover, develop, or market drugs. They often produce a single product or are 
subcontractors for larger firms (Ohara 1996). 
Given this fragmentation, it is not surprising Japan has a large number of drug 
manufacturing plants due to the many different diseases for which doctors and hospitals 
want to ensure quick drug delivery for each treatment. Secondly, the production following 
bulk manufacturing involves less complex, less expensive technologies where capital 
requirements are small but the rate of return is high since the industry is still growing. 
Tnirdly, entry barriers at this stage are low and scale economies appear weak (Ohara 
1996). However, due to entry by new large well capitalized Japanese and foreign 
producers, the situation for smaller companies is becoming less bright since the new 
entrants are larger and can purchase or develop the information technology necessary to 
build R&D, marketing and clinical trial capabilities. Even big Japanese companies such as 
Takeda are much smaller than leading foreign drug companies or large Japanese chemical 
and food producers. Takeda's 1994 pharmaceutical sales were $4,856 million. However, 
Takeda appears to be responding to these challenges as well as the changing economic 
environment created by MHW's new policies. Given its long nistory, this is not surprising. 
Takeda was founded in 1781 as a wholesale company of traditional Chinese and Japanese 
medicines. In the second half of the 19th century, it started handling Western medicines and 
gradually focused on these products, beginning drug production in 1915. Since then, it has 
always been Japan's leading pharmaceutical company. 
However, while ranking first in pharmaceuticals in Japan and 12th or 13th in the 
world, it has traditionally been a diversified company for many years. 
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This has been due to excess competition in pharmaceuticals, the need to support many 
employees, and the possibility of transferring technologies from medicine to related areas. 
To manage these various areas, the company organized on a multi-divisional basis in 1960: 
pharmaceuticals, pharmaceutical sales, food, chemical products, and an overseas division. 
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However, the divisions were neither profit nor cost centers. Rather, to maintain 
harmonious relationships among the divisions, profits and deficits were shared. They also 
avoided lower wages in new functions outside ethical pharmaceuticals. In this same year 
Takeda created the managerial administrative and technology control offices to collect and 
analyze information to assist executive decisions. Over the past 35 years, these two offices 
have helped Takeda analyze its economic environment and make forecasts using computer 
simulation. They have also established a long tradition in the use of information 
technology to improve Takeda's competitiveness and strategic position. 
A former President, Mr. Umemoto, stressed the role of basic research as licensing 
foreign drugs was getting more difficult. Foreign firms could now develop their own 
Japanese subsidiaries. Therefore in 1988, Takeda established a research laboratory at 
Tsukuba which does basic research. Mr. Umemoto also initiated other reforms, 
introducing word processors, computers, and optical fiber systems to process invoices 
centrally. Tnis was because PMS (post marketing surveillance) of their commercial drugs, 
while not required, was encouraged by MHW. Takeda thus organized DIONET (Takeda's 
pharmaceutical information system) to collect data about side effects and give feedback to 
users. Takeda also increased its international presence in the late 1970's through joint 
ventures in France and West Germany in addition to foreign subsidiaries supporting export 
sales. Takeda formed an R&D partnership with Abbott in the 1980's, and subsequently, 
TAP Pharmaceuticals, a joint venture with Abbott in 1985. 
Although not known for innovative drugs, Japanese firms are becoming bigger 
players in world markets. Takeda's Leuplin (Lupron Depot) wnich they started marketing 
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in 1992, is a luteinizing hormone-releasing hormone (LH-RH) analog. It is an injectable 
prostate cancer drug with a once-a-month dosage drug delivery system (DDS). Without 
tnis drug delivery system, patients have to get an injection every day for many years. Since 
such an arrangement is unrealistic, DDS makes sure the drug is absorbed inside the body 
slowly and uniformly over a long interval. This drug was developed in cooperation with 
Abbott, and later with Wako Pharmaceuticals too. It is marketed in some 60 countries 
under various names. 
Pharmaceutical Product Sales in Japan for 1995 (Nakazawa 1997) 
R&D Expenditure in Pharmaceutical Companies for 1995 (Nakazawa 1997) 
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sales increased 3.8% from the prior fiscal year to US $7,559 million with sales outside 
Japan of US$951 million, or 18.4% higher than the previous year. Overseas revenues now 
constitute 12.6% of net sales. Their strategy has been to transfer production of mature 
products to related companies while keeping the parent slim. Takeda had 69 subsidiaries in 
1993, though not all were pharmaceutical. This is very large compared to other drug 
companies and is roughly the same number as Toyota. At the same time, Takeda plays a 
wholesaler's role for related companies which account for 40% of their pharmaceutical 
sales (Giga, Ueda, and Kuramoto 1996). This approach is changing, though, as they snift 
production facilities to foreign countries to cut costs. 
Their business is now in transition due to the large competitive changes in global 
drug markets as well as in Japan's regulatory framework. Both trends will transform 
Japan's pharmaceutical market into one more open to foreign competition. Changes 
include the emerging new life sciences and drug development techniques discussed above 
as well. Takeda's information technology has to accommodate these new technical and 
regulatory trends plus the need for increased partnering. All Japanese pharmaceutical firms 
are aware of the industry's recent global consolidations such as Medco-Merck, Glaxo-
Wellcome, Pharmacia-Upjohn, SmithKline-Beecham, and Roche-Genentech. As these 
stronger players have expanded into Japan, Takeda has had to reorient its strategies. Thus, 
recent renewals in corporate culture have been very conspicuous among Japanese 
companies, indicating the strategic pressures. 
In the past, even among pharmaceutical companies whose management has usually 
accepted the characteristics of Japanese management, Takeda was known for its group-
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oriented management, its seniority-based organizational structure, and its lifetime 
employment. However, President Takeda and his management team are now introducing 
new initiatives in corporate governance and human resource management very different 
from the past. It is reducing its 11,000 employees to 7,500 by the year 2005, mainly 
through natural attrition. It is introducing performance-based pay, especially in ethical 
related R&D where there has been intense competition for innovative researchers on 
whom corporate success depends. Under this system, raises depend heavily on individual 
performance (Shukan Toyo Keizai 1997). For middle managers and above, annual goals 
will be set, and each will be evaluated in absolute terms based on their acnieving them. If 
managers cannot achieve their objectives within four years, they have to leave the position 
(Shukan Toyo Keizai 1995). This "American" approach reflects the U.S. Hay Group that 
consults with Takeda on their human resource policies. 
Takeda has also instituted special rewards for discovering innovative drugs 
generating significant sales. This can reach fifty million yen over five years. Tnis applies to 
R&D employees only and is to reward individual creativity. Tnis is exceptional in Japanese 
industry and may well be more "American" than the U.S. At the same time, R&D is now 
becoming a diverse team effort requiring many skills with computers helping to facilitate 
cooperation among researchers from different scientific backgrounds. Thus, some 
researchers argue management should reward the effort of the whole team on a successful 
project (Gund, Maggiora, and Snyder 1996). Since employees outside R&D cannot 
benefit from the new reward structure, Takeda will consider similar rewards in other 
divisions if there are suitable proposals, though the competitive pressures to retain creative 
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R&D personnel are not as readily apparent. 
Furthermore, to strategically concentrate on the growth and development of their 
etnical drug business, they recently reorganized their other divisions into "companies" 
each of wnich has its own president in charge of that company's operations subject to 
explicit objectives. These "companies" are: consumer health care, bulk vitamin & food, 
chemical products, agro-business, and life-environment. While they remain organizational 
functions inside Takeda, they operate separately. However, the president, Kunio Takeda, 
directly manages the etnical drug business, indicating its strategic importance wnile other 
businesses have become semi-autonomous profit centers. Since Takeda does not deal in 
generic drugs because of their ability to continue sales even after the patent expires and 
there is no effective competition from generic drug manufacturers in Japan, Takeda 
concentrates their organizational resources on the ethical drug market. 
Takeda's total expenditures on EDP including IT are about ¥6.8 billion, or a little 
less than 1% of its sales (Appendix II). Like most Japanese companies, in developing and 
selecting software to implement their business and organizational strategies, Takeda has 
relied little on outside vendors (Rapp 1995). However, they have not followed the trend 
towards increased use of subsidiaries specializing in software development. Rather, they 
have relied on their internal resources and IT group. This group has begun to move away 
from using only customized software and to increase the purchase and adaptation of 
packages. They state writing software used to be part of organizational learning, but the 
benefits from restructuring their information systems now outweigh the organizational 
learning and accumulation of tacit knowledge that occurs through creating most software 
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in-house. This decision is understandable since MHW's new regulatory and drug approval 
processes combined with international harmonization of clinical trials under ICH requires 
types of information systems skills and knowledge much different from that used in 
previous software development. Still, since current systems exist and must be interfaced 
with the new systems, whether packaged or customized, There thus remain substantial 
systems'maintenance and software interface development requiring their traditional skill 
sets in addition to acquiring new software development and semi-customization 
capabilities. 
Their general criteria to choose software appears to reflect this transitional period. 
That is, they try to select software that is a de facto standard and is used globally. Still, it 
must work on their existing hardware in Japan, meaning it must be capable of becoming 
part of an open system that promotes compatibility and communication between 
subsystems. Also, Takeda has no experience adopting a different hardware or software 
system to use a particular software package. When they need a supercomputer, they 
borrow it. Their system selection is influenced though by MHW and FDA regulations that 
apply to manufacturing, clinical trials, and payment. That is, their software and 
information systems have to provide sufficient information to meet regulatory standards. 
In this sense, their software system and its evolution has strategic and industry specific 
issues wnich it must support within a legacy framework. It must thus maintain the latter to 
insure compatibility. Yet, there is some flexibility since they do not require the operation 
systems used in the "companies" to be the same as that used in the ethical drug business, 
though there is a need to standardize accounting software. This accounting software is 
customized since their cost measures are sometimes not available in a package. To handle 
this IT work, Takeda has 116 people in information systems and 76 in user systems, many 
of whom have spent their career in information systems. In procuring software, they 
explain to several suppliers their requirements and compare proposals submitted by those 
suppliers. 
Their software selection is heavily influenced by R&D requirements and partnering 
agreements. For example, Takeda has a technological transfer agreement with SmithKline 
Beecham (SKB). SKB is transferring their expertise in combinatorial chemistry to Takeda 
which involves using computers and SKB's database. Researchers of both companies visit 
one another to transfer know-how associated with the technology. Takeda uses the UNIX 
(Hewlett-Packard) system and Windows 95 as their standard, but they also use 
Macintoshes in addition to PC's in their R&D. However, Takeda does not allow MACs to 
be connected with the network because they have found it difficult to make them 
compatible with their standard system. But, they do permit drug researchers to use MACs 
because information systems people at the R&D centers choose the software used in R&D 
and MACs are necessary for certain types of medical research. This is the one exception to 
their statement noted above that they do not buy particular hardware and software in 
order to carry out specific tasks, but rather usually adopt a range of existing hardware and 
systems to their purposes.. 
The packaged software Takeda has adapted to its overall system is SAP's R/36. 
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 SAP R/3 runs on most types of UNIX, Windows NT and OS/400. Some versions on mainframes (open MVS) also 
exist. SAP has a 33% world market share in enterprise applications, which is the largest. Its success secret is its 
holistic approach. Rather than combining many specialized software, SAP offers a bundle of software packages that 
faciliates information exchange among them to make better business decisions. SAP is especially suited for 
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This German software consists of modules that handle asset management, controller 
functions, financial accounting, human resource management, industry specific solutions, 
plant maintenance, production planning, project systems, quality management, sales and 
distribution, materials management and business workflow. SAP R/3 was designed for 
open systems (UNIX). Mr. Sato at Takeda thinks R/3, wnich allows for open systems and 
therefore can be more easily adapted to an existing system, is a major improvement over 
R/2. Since R/3 allows for semi-customization, the databases allow Takeda to see 
relationships among data to make coordinated decisions. They can also select the modules 
that are useful to them without adapting SAP's total system. Some Japanese 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, including Takeda, are now collaborating with SAP in 
making packages which will be used specifically in Japan's pharmaceutical business. Still, 
because Takeda's corporate strategy is based on systematic information gathering coupled 
with higniy technical analysis, in addition to gathering quantitative information, managerial 
decision making requires highly qualitative decision making too. Therefore, Japanese face-
to-face communication in making critical decisions remains essential. In these cases, 
information technology is coupled with R&D phase reviews. Their decision criteria are 
safety, efficacy, marketability, and pharmacoeconomics. 
Software contributes to information sharing within the company. For example, 
they use Intranet among their employees and e-mail is common as well, even though e-
mail has not been extensively used by most Japanese corporations. When certain data or 
information is relevant to a section, people witnin the section share that information. Such 
multinational companies, since SAP makes sure they can hundle multiple languages, currencies, regulations 
(Business Week, November 3). 
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sharing is traditional in Japan but has always been done face-to-face or through circulating 
memos via well established but time consuming routes ("ringi" system). The willingness to 
use e-mail substantially increases the speed with wnich this process can occur, leading to 
big increases in office productivity. Various interfaces with their databases are generally in 
Japanese characters or Kanji. Most commonly they use word processor software when 
asking questions about drugs on a real time basis. But when manipulating data, employees 
generally use spreadsheet software such as Excel. They are also planning to use more 
Web-based technologies not only in R&D but also in other functions. By using servers for 
common projects or applications used by more than one group or individual, they avoid 
the excessive workloads that can occur when they change personnel or the shape of a 
project as compared with when particular projects or applications are carried on individual 
PCs. They are also connected with their wholesalers through EDI (Electronic Data 
Interchange), a protocol standardized among Japanese pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
their wholesalers. Under tnis system, order entry and acknowledgment are processed on 
line, substantially reducing paperwork and facilitating prompt delivery. In general, 
Takeda's approach to software's development and use stresses incremental improvements 
in their database to improve decision making that is closely aligned with their basic 
business and current procedures. 
The most important tool in the information exchange between sales and 
manufacturing is the "sales-manufacturing balance table." Tnis shows past monthly sales, 
monthly production, planned montniy sales, planned montniy production, inventory, and 
intermediate goods inventory for each product. Based on this data, they meet montniy 
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with manufacturing to plan subsequent production. This provides a basis for the daily 
production schedules they create using artificial intelligence software. This software helps 
them adjust production to accommodate the volatility in schedules within a month given 
changes in customer demand. They analyze volatility using ten days as a planning period 
rather than a month. The process reduces inventories and storage costs wnile improving 
cycle and response times as well as customer satisfaction.. 
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Information Technology and Organization 
Takeda faces an environment where it must justify the use of its drugs to an 
increasingly cost conscious customer in terms of improved efficacy and benefits while 
developing new drugs is now more complex and expensive. Yet, they recognize that oniy 
by developing and marketing new and more effective drugs can the firm grow and prosper. 
Furthermore, these must be sold on a global basis to amortize nigh development costs. To 
do this efficiently requires sopnisticated techniques to acquire and manipulate large 
amounts of data in a standardized manner at several levels, including R&D, clinical trials, 
manufacturing, marketing and after sales results. Therefore, successfully using systematic 
research data and sophisticated analytical methods in their decision making is critical to 
their business and future growth. However, even though the need to use information 
technology is clear, Takeda believes the purpose of these systems is to improve the firm's 
existing decision-making skills which have been responsible for its success. Using systems 
should not result in automatic managerial decisions but rather should improve the quality 
of decisions by enhancing the manager's experience and judgment. Thus, even though one 
important use of software is to facilitate better communication, Takeda believes in face-to-
face communication among managers in formulating strategies. 
At the same time, it does not believe the more information everyone has the better, 
i.e. that all information should be freely shared among everyone in the firm. They 
consciously try to create some barriers among non-R&D employees to limit information 
flow to those with some need to know. However, they are reluctant to create such 
information barriers among R&D employees since they usually request information when 
there is a reason, or an impulse important to the creative process. Indeed, using software 
provides researchers with a common language in which they think and talk. It is essential 
for multi-disciplinary medical researchers to have a common ground and share parts of 
their chemical intuition. Using software enlarges and extends researchers' knowledge 
domains. Rather, Mr. Sato at Takeda noted that the difference in information sharing 
perspective comes from the fact that R&D people know the value and appropriate need 
for information, while non-R&D people may not. 
Thus, they keep some information from some Medical Representatives to avoid possible 
mistakes. This is especially true of sensitive information, such as clinical results. However 
higniy qualified representatives have full access to this data. From Takeda's perspective, 
information is most valuable when those with good judgment understand and use it. 
Their basic approach of using information technology to enhance and improve 
existing core competencies avoids many organizational dilemmas since people can see 
their effectiveness and the company's competitiveness is improved without the need for 
substantial reorganization and accompanying disruption. Tnis strategy contrasts with 
companies such as Bayer that use a minmax approach to software use and development 
wnich focuses on acnieving maximum user functionality for the least cost. Under this 
system, a firm uses a package if it achieves 80% of the functionality users request but does 
not evaluate whether the additional 20% represents a critical added value or is important 
to maintaining a core competency. Also, it stresses centralized IT control more to facilitate 
upgrades than to develop strategies and allocate resources. They do not support certain 
R&D functions even when the user may require it to efficiently utilize an historical data 
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base or certain programs which may only be available for a MAC or VAX system. The 
minmax strategy is supported by a review process with a check list of 20 to 25 benefits 
that are evaluated for each IT project, making it difficult to isolate one or two key 
business factors in terms of IT integration or the enhancement of core competencies 
critical to the drug pipeline (Track 1997). This also complicates any evaluation of 
whether a particular IT project is a success. 
The press and reengineering specialists have stressed that one outcome of 
improved information systems is a flattened organization because it is easier for top 
management to communicate with lower levels, and middle management is no longer 
required to process information or manage and set objectives for smaller units. Being able 
to eliminate middle managers saves money and is thus cost efficient. But Takeda felt any 
such effect from the increased use of information technology has been indirect, since they 
flattened their organization first to prepare for future competition and make each person's 
responsibilities clearer. They had to become slimmer because their competitors did. The 
role of information technology has been to assist each person in becoming more 
productive in their defined responsibilities. Easier monitoring of subordinates via improved 
information systems was not a reason for moving to a flatter organization. Tnis result is 
similar to other responses from the leading software users that have been interviewed 
indicating the role of information technology has been to enhance and extend existing 
strategies and core competencies rather than to restructure or change the organization. At 
the same time, through a creative mix of customized, semi-customized and packaged 
software, Takeda has created an information system and organizational support for that 
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system which have significantly improved their competitiveness in several areas. An 
important aspect of this has been the interactive linking of various functions that 
previously were relatively separate: R&D, the drug approval process, manufacturing, 
marketing, sales and after-sales service. Takeda's close association with large hospitals 
and clinics through DIONET and its successors provides such a function. 
Another information system's benefit linking previously separate functions is the 
increased complexity of manufacturing the new right-handed and left-handed drugs 
created through molecular modeling. Some of these processes are new and can be 
patented since they often require several steps in different manufacturing facilities. Tnis 
manufacturing complexity extends the traditional life of a drug and justifies concentrating 
greater research resources to their development. 
In the introduction to this case, it was noted that a potential new production 
paradigm might be emerging, one pioneered by leading companies in industries as diverse 
as finance, semiconductors and pharmaceuticals. It seems to differ from mass production 
which is essentially supply push and where significantly lower costs create their own 
demand. It also appears to differ from lean production wnich is more.demand pull but with 
even lower costs than mass production, especially in terms of defects and inventories. We 
have called it "controlled" production because firms using it seem to have organized to 
access the information necessary to monitor and control all aspects of their business and 
then act upon it competitively as a firm. This appears to be what Takeda does in their 
approach to R&D, clinical trials, manufacturing, marketing, sales and after-sales support. 





"Easton, George S. and Sherry L. Jarrell, "Using Strategic Quality Planning More Effectively: Lessons 
Learned from NSF Project Research," Columbia Business School conference presentation, September 1997. 
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IT Operations 
Are IT costs balanced against overall long-term productivity gains? x 
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Summary Answers for Case - Conclusions 
Conclusions and Results 
Is mission statement consistent strategies identified as successful or 
appropriate existing competitiveness research Sloan's industry center? * e s 
Are there important business or IT situations that require further
 Y March 
research? 24, 
Are intellectual property issues important in explaining successful and Yes 
sustainable use software to acnieve competitive advantage? 
Are beneficial cost impacts generally an important consequence of a Yes 
successful software strategy? 
Yes Based on this study is market for vertical application and embedded 
software growing? 
Yes 
Does tnis leading Japanese firm assign positive value to improved 
integration and enhanced control through selective customization? 
Do general measures such as increased productivity, as evidenced by y e s 
reduced cycle times and lower defect rates, reflect benefits successful 
software strategy? 
Are benefits successful software strategy reflected in specific industry Some 
standards such as an expanded customer base, more drugs in pipeline, 
or improved yields? 
Yes Does tnis leading IT user have explicit criteria for selecting package or 
customized software and for semi-customizing software packages? 
Does firm closely integrate software and business strategies beyond Yes 
mere alignment? 
Yes 
Do they closely integrate organizational/HR policies and IT systems? 
Have they reorganized to use software and information technology? 
Does firm's software codify or use existing organizational strengths or ^ o t 
core competencies including HR alignment with business and IT Yes Clear 
strategies? 
Does firm embrace and integrate IT as part business strategies and core y e s 
competencies? 





KEY PRODUCTS UNDER DEVELOPMENT 
Leuplin is the brand name in Japan for leuprolide, a luteinizing hormone-releasing hormone (LH-RH) analog. 
In Japan, Takeda began marketing it in September 1992 as a once-monthly dosage injectable prostate cancer 
drug, and received approval for the additional indications of endometriosis and central precocious puberty in July 
1994. Applications for the additional indications of breast cancer and uterine fibroids were filed in October 1994, 
and Takeda expects to receive approval in autumn 1996. In March 1995, Takeda also filed an application for a 
dual-chamber prefilled syringe (DPS) kit that will make Leuplin easier to handle. 
Outside Japan, Takeda markets leuprolide in some 60 countries under brand names including Lupron Depot 
in North America and Enantone and others in Europe and Asia. Takeda has either received approval or filed 
applications overseas for the use of leuprolide as a treatment for prostate cancer, central precocious puberty, 
breast cancer, endometriosis and uterine fibroids. An application for a DPS kit has been filed in European 
countries other than Germany, and it has received approval in the United States and Germany. A three-month 
sustained-release injectable formulation has been approved in the United States and Germany, and applications 
for it have been filed in other European countries. Takeda expects steady approvals for new indications and 
dosage formulations to expand the performance of this product. 
Takepron, a proton pump inhibitor, is the brand name in Japan for lansoprazole. Takeda introduced it in 
December 1992 as a treatment for gastric and duodenal ulcers and reflux esophagitis. Applications for 
intravenous use as a treatment for postoperative invasive stress and upper gastrointestinal bleeding (additional 
indication and new formulation) are now under preparation. Additional indications for gastritis and Helicobacter 
pylori eradication are in Phase II in Japan. 
Takeda markets lansoprazole in more than 55 countries as a treatment for reflux esophagitis and gastric and 
duodenal ulcers. This drug has received approval for maintenance therapy in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and France, and applications for this use have been filed in Germany, Italy and elsewhere. Moreover, 
the United Kingdom and France have approved lansoprazole for eradicating H. pylori, and this indication is now 
in Phase III in the United States and elsewhere in Europe. 
Voglibose, a disaccharidase inhibitor for preventing postprandial hyperglycemia in diabetes mellitus launched in 
Japan in 1994 as Basen, is in Phase II in the United States and Phase II/III in Europe. Takeda expects to file an 
application in Europe in 1997. 
A thromboxane A2 receptor antagonist for bronchial asthma, seratrodast is in Phase III in the United States and 
Phase II in Europe. In December 1995 it was launched in Japan (brand name: Bronica), where an additional 
indication for allergic rhinitis is in Phase II. 
Cefozopran, a broad spectrum injectable cephalosporin, was launched in August 1995 in Japan as Firstcin. 
An additional indication for the treatment of children is under application. 
A thromboxane A2 synthetase inhibitor for transient ischemic attack, isbogrel is under application in Japan. 
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Candesartan cilexetil is an angiotensin II receptor antagonist, and preparation for its application for 
hypertension is now under way in Japan. This agent is in Phase II in Japan for additional indications for cardiac 
failure, diabetic nephropathy and nephritis. It is in Phase III for hypertension and cardiac failure in Europe and 
in Phase II/III in the United States. 
Jointly developed with Bayer Yakuhin, this HMG-CoA (hydromethyl glutaryl coenzyme A) reductase inhibitor is 
under application for hypercholesterolemia in Japan. 
A potentiator of insulin action for non-insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, this agent is in Phase III in Japan 
and Takeda expects to file an application in 1996. It is in Phase II for diabetes mellitus in the United States. 
This sustained-release thyrotropin releasing hormone for vascular dementia is in Phase II in Japan. 
A cholinesterase inhibitor for dementia of Alzheimer's type, TAK-147 is in Phase II in Japan. 
A bone resorption inhibitor for osteoporosis, this agent is in Phase II in Japan. 
An endothelin receptor antagonist, TAK-044 is in Phase II for ischemic hepatic dysfunction and acute myocardial 
infarction in Japan, and in Phase II for acute renal failure and subarachnoid hemorrhage in Europe. 
This anti-angiogenesis agent for treating malignant tumors is in Phase II in the United States. 
This immunomodulatory agent for treating rheumatoid arthritis recently entered Phase II in Japan and Phase I 
in the United States. 
A brain energy-metabolism enhancer for treating dementia of Alzheimer's type, idebenone is under application in 
Germany and in Phase II in the United States. 54 
FJNA^IALHIGHLIGHTS 1994-96 
R&D EXPENDITURES 1992-96 (Takeda 1996) 
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PRODUCTIVITY MAJOR DRUG COMPANIES 1992-97 (Nakazawa 1997) 
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